Timeline: 1910-1919
The RCN in World War I
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1910-1919
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On the 29th of July 1914, a warning telegram was received by the Canadian Government which outlined that there was the possibility war between Britain and Germany.
By the 1st of Aug 1914, all RCN Midshipmen were recalled from leave, and naval authorities in Halifax and Esquimalt were empowered to enroll volunteers. HMCS NIOBE and HMCS RAINBOW were ordered prepared for operational duty.
On the 2nd of Aug 1914, the Naval Service assumed control of all Canadian wireless stations, and all collectors of customs at the seaports are instructed to give notice of the fact that the Admiralty had called out the Royal Navy Reserve. The Volunteer Reserve company at Victoria was ordered to report to the Esquimalt dockyard for active duty.
On the 3rd of Aug 1914, HMCS RAINBOW put to sea on her first operational cruise. Ammunition was distributed to shore defences, equipment was made ready and personnel were rounded up. The Victoria Times reported: "Esquimalt presented an animated appearance... Its busy streets remind one of the days, not far back, when the British fleet made Esquimalt its home port. Throughout the afternoon and well on into the evening, many Victorians and a number of the people visiting this city took the street cars to the naval town to look over what may be the scene of an engagement."
HMCS NIOBE in Halifax.
At 8:55 p.m. on the 4th of August, 1914, a telegram was received from Westminster announcing that war had been declared against Germany. That same evening, HMCS NIOBE and HMCS RAINBOW were "placed at the disposal of His Majesty for general service in the Royal Navy." CGS CANADA and CGS MARGARET were transferred from the Department of Customs to the Naval Service and were ordered to hoist the white ensign, and all the naval and naval volunteer forces were placed on active service. Arrangements were made by NSHQ to secure daily information concerning German cruisers near the Pacific Coast. HMCS RAINBOW was already at sea, and was therefore the first ship of the RCN to be at sea as a belligerent.
However, even when all preparations had been made, RAINBOW was still weak at many points. Her wireless had a maximum range of 200 miles and she had no high explosive ammunition, just old-style shells filled with gunpowder. She had no collier, and no dependable coaling station south of Esquimalt. Less than half of the full complement was on board, and more than a third of these were RCNV Reservists, many of whom knew nothing about ships or the sea. In the German official war history, she was known as the "Canadian training ship RAINBOW." Until reinforcements from the RN squadron in Japan arrived however, RAINBOW was all there was to protect Imperial interests on the west coast of North America.
After
the battle of Coronel, RAINBOW would cooperate with the British-Japanese
(B-J) squadron, but this was short-lived as she really could not
keep up. However, for a
time, when it was considered that von Spee and his squadron were
heading north for a
possible engagement with the B-J squadron, the CO of RAINBOW sent:
“Submit that
Admiralty may be asked to arrange with Senior Officer of Allied Squadron ... that Canadian Ship RAINBOW shall if possible, be in company with squadron when engaged with enemy.” He was refused, with reasons, one of which was that there would be severe criticism if RAINBOW was lost while engaging more ‘modern’ vessels.
When hostilities began, the only naval reserve force in the country was the volunteer unit in Victoria. They played an important role in manning HMCS RAINBOW, CC] and CC2 (see 7 Aug 1914), their parent ship HMS SHEAR WA TER and other vessels in Esquimalt. They also provided personnel for HMS NEWCASTLE, after that cruiser arrived in BC waters.
During
the war, the Naval Service would recruit over 9000 officers and
ratings, broken down as follows:
RCN-
1,000
RN and RNR- 600
RNCVR:
Atlantic Subdivision - 4,300
Pacific Subdivision - 2,000
Overseas Division - 1,700
Total: 9,600
The Canadian Government provisionally granted 10 days grace for German merchantmen to leave Canadian ports on the 5th of Aug 1914. This was later extended to include Austro-Hungarian ships as well. That same day, the Navy League of Canada informed NSHQ that it had rounded up 50 ex-ratings who were willing and able to crew HMCS NIOBE. The Admiralty also indicated that Canada would have first pick of the services of retired RN officers living in Canada.
CC1 at sea in the Straits of Juan de Fuca.
Meanwhile, the BC Government agreed to pay $1,150,000.00 for two submarines which had been purchased for “protection of transatlantic trade routes.”
On the 8th of Sep 1914, HMS SHEARWATER was commissioned to act as the depot ship for CC1 and CC2. Together they would provide protection against a reported German cruiser which had been reported to be in the area. The reported German ship proved to be a myth.
On the 1st of Nov 1914, the first Canadian Naval Service casualties of the war, Midshipmen Cann, Palmer, Silver and Hathaway were lost at battle of Coronel.
The victims of the von Spee squadron, they had been serving in HMS GOOD HOPE, the flag-ship of Sir Christopher Craddock, which was lost with all hands.
Six weeks later, on the 8th of Dec 1914, the German squadron, victors at Coronel, were themselves destroyed at the battle of Falkland Islands by a British battle cruiser force. After this, allied naval power was never again in question in the Pacific.
In April 1916, the Admiralty advised the Canadian Government that German U-boats may be crossing the Atlantic, that they would operate close to Canadian and Newfoundland coasts, and that it would take a craft fitted with at least a 12 pounder gun to put them out of action. The Canadian Government would later be advised by Admiralty that "should enemy submarines appear of the Canadian coasts, my cruisers (probably the 4th Cruiser Squadron) are no protection to transports against submarine attacks." How to protect the east coast from submarines became an issue between the Government and Admiralty. The Canadian Government, which had sent every trained gunner and spare gun to England, expected Admiralty to increase the size of the east coast patrol from twelve to thirty-six vessels. Admiralty, in return, even though unrestricted warfare had not been declared, was already under tremendous pressure to protect areas where submarines were not only feared, but were actually gathering in large numbers. They therefore declined to provide for the east coast patrols.
By the 31st of Jan 1917, Germany had initiated unrestricted submarine warfare. This meant that shipping found in the Mediterranean and the north-eastern Atlantic would be sunk on sight. This declaration did not apply to Canadian and Newfoundland waters, but it did intensify the danger to shipping in close proximity to these territorial waters. Germany had already been producing improved U-boats in large numbers. They were larger, more powerfully armed and had a greater cruising radius than their predecessors.
This situation intensified the need for the east coast patrols, and accordingly, Sir Robert Borden appealed directly to the Admiralty for trained gunners and guns. This appeal, coupled with the increased danger from submarines, resulted in large contributions to the east coast patrols by the Admiralty, contributions that would continue until the war was over. The Admiralty released enough 12 pounder guns to arm the flotilla, and promised to do everything it could about trained ratings. Moreover, it asked the Canadian Government to organize and supervise the construction of 36 trawlers and 100 drifters, at Admiralty expense.
Even with all these actions, shipping losses to submarines hit 169 ships, totaling 545,282 gross tons in April 1917.
None of the vessels ordered by Admiralty or the Canadian Government were ready for use in the summer of 1917. Like many other enterprises of this nature, construction of the trawlers and drifters fell behind schedule. However, by early October the auxiliary fleet consisted of 118 vessels (89 Admiralty and 29 Canadian). All operations, except for those craft attached to Halifax, came under the direction of the Captain of Patrols, who operated out of Sydney, NS. The 12 trawlers belonging to the Naval Service were modelled on the North Sea fishing vessels of the same name. They weighed about 136 tons, had a speed of about 10 knots and cost about $191,000.00 apiece to build. Some commercial or pleasure boats had been obtained from other government departments or purchased from the United States. Three others had been private Canadian Yachts.
One of these, Grilse, was a very formidable patrol vessel. She carried a torpedo tube, two 12-pounder guns and could travel at 32 knots. All patrol vessels carried between 2 and 6 depth charges, and many were fitted with radios. They all wore the White Ensign. They could attack a hostile submarine with gun-fire if it was surfaced, and with depth charges if it was not. Properly managed, they would either destroy the submarine, damage it or drive it away.
Plans for the patrols went ahead initially under the Admiralty’s expert. His time in office was shortened by his ability to tread on the toes of others, and he was quickly replaced. Captain Walter Hose transferred from HMCS RAiNBOW to NSHQ to organize east coast anti-submarine patrols. He was later appointed Captain of Patrols to replace the Admiralty expert. Captain Hose held this position until the end of the war.
The east coast patrols had to cover the area from Belle Isle to the Bay of Fundy, and from Rimouski to the Virgin Rocks. Their sole purpose was to protect shipping in those waters, and as they increased in number this protection assumed various forms. The patrols were a necessary precaution, and may have been a deterrent as well. They were able to build up, along with the auxiliary fleets stationed elsewhere, the lion’s share of the experiences on which the WW2 campaign against submarines would be based. There were many precedents: it was the first fleet to be commanded by an officer of the RCN, it contained the first ships build expressly for the Naval Service, and it faced the first direct naval attack in the history of the country.
On the 21st of Jun 1917, CC1 and CC2, along with SHEARWATER, were ordered transferred to Halifax from Esquimalt.
On the 6th of Dec 1917, two ships, SS IMO and SS MONT BLANC, both carrying pilots and in clear weather, collided in Halifax harbour, in circumstances described as “extraordinarily mismanaged” (Eventually the House of Lords would blame both pilots and masters as having ignored an elementary rule of the road, summed up in an RN jingle: “In danger with no room to turn, Ease her - stop her - go astern!”). MONT BLANC exploded, devastating the city and the dockyard.
Navy casualties were 20 dead, I died in hospital, I missing and presumed dead, and 8 injured. Seven of the casualties were members of NIOBE’s crew who had set off for the MONT BLANC to try to scuule her. They had just pulled alongside when she exploded.
NIOBE was also seriously damaged, but as a depot ship, could be repaired and continued to serve until 1920.
By March 1918, it was considered by the Admiralty that the appearance of submarines on the western side of the Atlantic was now a distinct possibility, and advised that air defences should be set up on the east coast of the dominion.
Therefore, on the 20th of April 1918, a decision was taken to establish air stations at Cape Race (2 dirigibles and 2 kite balloons), Sydney (6 flying boats, 3 dirigibles and 4 kite balloons), Halifax (6 flying boats, 3 dirigibles and 4 kite balloons) and Cape Sable (3 flying boats or 2 dirigibles). As Canada possessed none of the equipment or trained personnel, the US was asked to provide them, pending the time that a Canadian organization should be in a position to do so.
Later that same summer of 1918, air patrols are added to supplement the activities of the east coast patrols with the establishment of the Royal Canadian Naval Air Service. The reason for the new service was “... that pending further consideration of the organization of a Canadian Air Service for military and for naval purposes and in order to provide for immediate needs, it is desirable that Canadian personnel be enrolled and trained for service in connection with the bases at Halifax and Sydney’.” The base at Halifax was located at Baker Point, on the Eastern Passage about three miles south of Dartmouth. The North Sydney base was located at Kelley’s Beach on the western boundary of the town.
The cruising speed of the flying boats was about 60 knots, and their endurance was about 4 hours. There were four at each station, a number later increased to 6. The plan was to provide for air escort through the approaches to the two ports for all convoys, both inbound and outbound, keep a plane for emergency anti-submarine missions and to do a much patrolling as possible in addition. The remainder of the plans for more bases, dirigibles and kite balloons was overtaken by the Armistice of 11 November. The commanding officer of the American unit in Halifax was Lieutenant Richard E. Byrd, USN, who would later become widely known as an airman and Antarctic explorer.
At the Imperial conference in 1917, the Admiralty had been requested to work out, immediately after the conclusion of the war, what they considered the most effective scheme of naval defence for the Empire, and what contributions would be expected from the Dominion Governments. The Admiralty delivered its response in May 1918, calling for a single Empire Navy and an Imperial Naval Authority which would deal with “all questions of naval strategy and subjects connected with the provision, equipment, efficiency, organization and utilization of the Navy as a fighting force: promotions and appointments; principles of training; [and] the formation of requirements on which the annual estimates would be prepared.”
On the 15th of Aug 1918, the Dominion Prime Ministers made it clear that they were not overly impressed with the Admiralty response to their concerns, and considered ‘standardization’ of dominion navies as the best alternative to the Admiralty proposal. They agreed to “welcome visits from a highl~’ qualified representative of the Admiralty” to advise each of the dominions in turn on their separate naval defence needs.
In respect of the fledgling air service, the Government had authorized the entry of about 80 suitable young cadets between the ages of 17½ and 26 years, and about 1,000 ratings on the 5th of September 1918. In order to implement the policy of providing Canadian Personnel, candidates for entry as cadets were examined at centers across the country, and at the end of the month the first draft of cadets reached Boston Mass. to begin training. A much smaller number of cadets was also sent to Britain for their training. The recruiting of ratings was much slower, and no trained personnel were available before the war ended.
At the 11th hour of the 11th day of the 11th month of 1918 the Armistice was signed and World War I ended. In the Dominion of the post-war period, a feeling of hostility to any measures reminiscent of war, together with a strong desire for reductions in military expenditures, resulted in the disbandment of the naval air service. It would not appear again until the formation of the Naval Air Division of the RCN which would start in 1934.